Luke Mogelson, a contributing writer for the magazine, wrote this week's cover article about going on patrol with the Afghan National Army. He recently wrote for the magazine about the Afghanistan- Pakistan-Iran border region and a hospital in Kabul. He is the co-founder and editor of an online magazine called Razistan.
Where did you first get the (seemingly dangerous) idea to accompany the Afghan National Army on patrol?
Right now, embedding with the Afghan Army is the obvious thing for a journalist here to want to do. Every day the balance of responsibility tips further away from the international forces, toward the A.N.A. There is still a lot of fighting happening in Afghanistan — but most of it is being done by the Afghans.
It was by luck that I met Lt. Col. Mohammad Daowood and his battalion. I'd originally planned to embed with an Afghan unit in Logar Province, which borders Wardak. Along with the photographer Joël van Houdt and an interpreter, I drove down to Logar and linked up with the A.N.A. there, intending to get to some outposts in the south. Soon after we arrived, however, a commander told us that one of his platoons was leaving for Wardak to support a "big" A.N.A. operation scheduled to commence the next day. Did we want to go? We jumped in the convoy and ended up at Dash-e Towp.
Daowood has some unusual counterinsurgency methods. Did he develop those himself?
This is the third war in which Daowood has commanded soldiers. My impression was that he was guided mostly by instinct rather than any kind of formal strategic doctrine. Because of his deep experience, though, it was an instinct you were inclined to trust.
Did you see any other techniques that American soldiers do not use?
Well, I never saw this myself, but Daowood told me that they often go on patrols without bomb-disposal technicians, like Shafiullah, whom I mention in the article. At such times, according to Daowood, when they encounter an I.E.D., they shoot at it with rifles from a distance until it explodes.
You write about Shafiullah and Daowood and a Hazara soldier named Abdul Karim. Did the other A.N.A soldiers have background stories that caught your attention?
Every A.N.A. soldier has a story that I expect would capture anyone's attention. For that matter, so does nearly every adult Afghan at this point. You would have to live a pretty charmed life to have made it through the past few decades in Afghanistan unharried by adversity and grief.
You write that Americans blame "cultural differences" for the highly publicized "green on blue" killings. Have you talked to Afghans about these killings?
You know, I tried many times to get Afghan soldiers and officers to speak frankly about this. They were reluctant to do so. It was the one subject, in fact, that rendered them reticent, cagey. I think they felt ashamed. They seemed both mystified and embarrassed by the attacks. No one provided anything like a satisfying explanation or hypothesis. My colleagues at the Times bureau in Kabul have done a lot of trenchant and illuminating reporting on the green-on-blue phenomenon, however, and I'd refer to those articles anyone interested in trying to understand it.
You write that the decision to destroy far-flung posts and leave the A.N.A in charge seems like a retreat on the part of the coalition forces. Do the members of the A.N.A. that you spoke to see it that way?
Without question, the A.N.A. in Wardak did not want to give up those posts. Of course, some of the lower-ranking grunts might have been relieved not to have to man them anymore — life on a bigger base is much safer and more comfortable — but the officers all considered it a fatal tactical move.
